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Abstract
A variant of Reiter’s default logic is proposed as a logic for reasoning with (defeasible)
observations. Traditionally, default rules are assumed to represent generic information and the facts
are assumed to represent specific information about the situation, but in this paper, the specific
information derives from defeasible observations represented by (normal free) default rules, and the
facts represent (hard) background knowledge. Whenever the evidence underlying some observation
is more refined than the evidence underlying another observation, this is modelled by means of a
priority between the default rules representing the observations. We thus arrive at an interpretation
of prioritized normal free default logic as an observation logic, and we propose a semantics for this
observation logic. Finally, we discuss how the proposed observation logic relates to the multiple
extension problem and the problem of sensor fusion.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we propose a variant of Reiter’s default logic [14] as a logic for reasoning
with (defeasible) observations. A default theory consists of a set of facts and a set of default
rules. Traditionally, default rules are assumed to represent general, or generic, information,
such as ‘typically, birds fly’ and the facts are assumed to represent specific information
about the situation, such as ‘Tweety is a bird’. However, in this paper we consider the case
where the specific information derives from defeasible observations and is modelled by a
default rule, and the general information denotes (hard) background knowledge modelled
by the facts in a default theory. (Thus with each new observation, not a fact, but a default
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rule is added to the default theory.) These characteristics apply, for example, to the situation
of an autonomous robot navigating through an environment using an a priori given map and
its not completely reliable sensors.
The nonmonotonic logic proposed in this paper is motivated by the logic of vision
proposed in [10], where perception reports are interpreted in inverse systems of first-
order models approximating reality. A perception of φ is modelled as the truth of φ
given some approximation plus a defeasible expectation that φ will also be true in
more refined approximations. Perceptions based on more refined evidence can defeat this
expectation. The systems of models approximating reality formalize layers of refinement
or approximation and the authors develop a logic with so-called conditional quantifiers for
a kind of resource bounded quantification which allows descriptions to vary with degrees
of refinement.
We abstract from the particular language of [10] and propose a version of prioritized
normal free default logic for reasoning with defeasible observations. Each observation is
modelled by a normal free default rule, i.e., a default rule which has a single justification
equivalent to its consequent and a tautology as prerequisite. To take account of the fact that
an observation can be defeated by another observation based on more refined evidence, we
add a preference order on the default rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we briefly
review some basic properties of default logic, and in particular of the special case where
default rules are normal and free. In Section 4, we describe how normal free default
logic with priorities between default rules can be interpreted as a logic for defeasible
observations. A semantics for this observation logic is then presented in Section 5. Finally,
we discuss how the proposed observation logic relates to the multiple extension problem
and the problem of sensor fusion.
2. Default logic
We repeat some definitions and results (without proof) from [14]. Let L be some
ordinary first-order language, and let Th denote an ordinary first-order consequence
operation for that language. (The dependence on L and Th of the definitions and results
below will mostly remain implicit.) Formulas of L are denoted by α,β, . . . . In examples,
propositional letters p,q, . . . are used, which are supposed to be included in the language.
Definition 1. A default rule is an expression of the form:
α :β1, . . . , βn
ω
(n 1).
The formula α is called the prerequisite, β1, . . . , βn are called the justifications, and ω the
consequent of the default rule. A default rule is called closed iff all the formulas appearing
in the rule are closed. If D is a set of default rules, then CONSEQ(D) denotes the set of
consequents of the default rules of D.
The default rule α :β1, . . . , βn/ω has the following intended meaning: If α can be
derived and each of the β1, . . . , βn is consistent with what is derivable, then derive ω.
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(This is the standard interpretation. Our interpretation of the default rules representing
observations will be slightly different. See Section 7.)
Definition 2. A default theoryD is a pair 〈D,Γ 〉, where D is a set of default rules and Γ is
a set of sentences of L. A default theory is called closed iff all its default rules are closed.
Definition 3. An extension of the closed default theory 〈D,Γ 〉 is a fixed point of the
function f : 2L → 2L given by: f (Σ) is the smallest set such that
(D1) Γ ⊆ f (Σ);
(D2) Th(f (Σ)) = f (Σ);
(D3) If α :β1, . . . , βn/ω ∈ D, α ∈ f (Σ) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ¬βi /∈ Σ , then ω ∈
f (Σ).
An extension of a default theory 〈D,Γ 〉 is intended to represent a reasonable state
of belief based on the default rules in D and facts in Γ . Below, we give a more informal
characterization of default extensions, which is essentially a reformulation of the semantics
for default logic given in [7].
Let Σ be a logically closed set of sentences of L. The default rule α :β1, . . . , βn/ω is
called applicable in Σ iff α ∈ Σ and for every βi , ¬βi /∈ Σ . If d = α :β1, . . . , βn/ω is
applicable in Σ , then the result of applying d to Σ is the set Th(Σ ∪ {ω}). An extension
E of a closed default theory 〈D,Γ 〉 is the result of sequentially applying to Th(Γ ) the
default rules of a subset D′ of D such that every default rule of D′ is applicable in E,
and E contains the consequent of each default rule applicable in E. D′ is called the set of
generating default rules of E.
A default theory may have more than one extension, and there exist default theories
without extensions. For example, 〈{ :p/p, :¬p/¬p},∅〉 has two extensions, namely
Th({p}) and Th({¬p}), and 〈{ :¬p/p},∅〉 does not have an extension.
So far, we have only defined the notion of extension for closed default theories. In
general, the extensions of a default theory 〈D,Γ 〉 are defined to be the extensions of the
closed default theory 〈D′,Γ 〉 where, roughly speaking, D′ is obtained from D by taking
all closed instances of D. (See [14,16] for details.) From now on, we will assume, without
loss of generality, that default theories are closed.
We have seen that not every default theory has an extension. However, there is a natural
class of default theories with at least one extension:
Definition 4. A default rule is called normal iff it has a single justification and this
justification is equivalent (in first-order logic) to its consequent. A default theory is called
normal iff all its default rules are normal.
Proposition 1 (Existence of extensions). Every normal default theory has an extension.
In addition to having at least one extension, a normal default theory has several other
nice properties. Some of these properties are listed below. None of the listed properties
holds for arbitrary default theories.
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Proposition 2 (Orthogonality of extensions). If E and F are distinct extensions of a normal
default theory, then E ∪ F is inconsistent.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness of extensions). If 〈D,Γ 〉 is a normal default theory and
Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D) is consistent, then 〈D,Γ 〉 has a unique extension.
Proposition 4 (Semi-monotonicity). Let D and D′ be sets of normal defaults such that
D ⊆ D′, and let E be an extension of 〈D,Γ 〉. Then 〈D′,Γ 〉 has an extension E′ ⊇ E.
3. Normal free default logic
One obtains an interesting fragment of default logic if the prerequisite of every default
rule is assumed to be a tautology. The default rules are then called (prerequisite-)free.
Definition 5. A default rule is called free iff its prerequisite is a tautology (in first-order
logic). A default theory is called free iff all its default rules are free.
In [15,16] it is argued that rational agents adhering to Savage’s ‘sure-thing principle’
should be willing to replace an arbitrary default rule α :β1, . . . , βn/ω by the free default
rule  :α ∧ β1, . . . , α ∧ βn/α → ω. In general, the resulting default theory will not be
equivalent to the original one. However, it is not hard to show that any default theory is
equivalent to a free (not necessarily normal) default theory.
An advantage of free default logic is that it allows reasoning by cases.
Example 1. Let D = 〈{p :q/q,¬p :q/q},∅〉. The default theory D does not allow the
obvious conclusion q since its unique extension is Th(∅). In [15,16] it is proposed to
replaceD by 〈{ :p∧q/p → q, :¬p∧q/¬p → q},∅〉, which has the unique extension
Th({q}).
In this paper, we are especially interested in normal free default logic, which is obtained
from default logic by assuming that the defaults free and normal. In the literature, normal
free defaults are sometimes called supernormal defaults. Normal free default logic is a
particularly well-behaved fragment of default logic, which has been studied by many
authors, including [2,3,5]. An example of a nice property of normal free default logic is
that the extensions of normal free default theories have a relatively simple characterization.
Proposition 5. Let D = 〈D,Γ 〉 be a normal free default theory. Then E is an extension of
D iff E = Th(Γ ∪CONSEQ(D′)), for some maximal D′ ⊆ D such that Γ ∪CONSEQ(D′)
is consistent.
Proof. The result immediately follows from the informal characterization of extensions
given in Section 2 and from the fact that a normal free default rule  :ω/ω is applicable in
Σ iff Σ ∪ {ω} is consistent. 
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Corollary 6. If D = 〈D,Γ 〉 is a normal free default theory and E is an extension of D,
then E is complete with respect to CONSEQ(D). That is, if ω ∈ CONSEQ(D), then either
ω ∈ E or ¬ω ∈ E.
Another interesting property of normal free default logic is that it induces a cumulative
(sceptical) consequence operation. See, for example, [16]. (Some nice characterizations
of this consequence operation are summarized in [13, Theorem 4.5.1].) The fact that the
consequence operation induced by unrestricted default logic is not cumulative has been
considered a drawback of default logic, and several authors have looked at ways to modify
default logic to make its consequence operation cumulative.
In the following section, we argue that a prioritized version of normal free default logic
can be interpreted as a logic for defeasible observations.
4. Observation logic
Consider a robot making an observation. In order to (symbolically) reason with the
observation, the subsymbolic information acquired by the sensors has to be translated into
a symbolic language. We assume that the observation systems of the robot translate the
raw sensory data into propositions expressed in a first-order language L. Each observation
is based on evidence which is limited in range and resolution, and which is therefore
only directly related to (part of) an approximation of reality. An observation induces an
expectation that what is observed will also hold for more refined approximations, but this
expectation can be defeated by observations based on more refined evidence.
Let φe denote the observation that φ based on evidence e. We can interpret this,
analogous to the rendition of perception reports in [10], as φ being true given the
approximation of reality induced by e plus a defeasible expectation that φ will also be true
in more refined approximations, including reality itself. For example, assume we have the
observations φe and ψe′ , where φ and ψ are incompatible (given the a priori knowledge)
and e′ is more refined than e. Then the expectation induced by φe is defeated by ψe′ .
To model the truth of φ given some approximation of reality we will introduce in our
semantics (partially) ordered sets of first-order models and let the observation that φ based
on evidence e induce the truth of φ in the model associated with the approximation of
reality obtained by e, together with the defeasible expectation that φ will be true in all
more refined models, where the refinement relation between models is formalized by the
partial order.
The (defeasible) expectation accompanying the observation φe intuitively seems to
imply the (normal) default rules φe :φe′/φe′ , for each e′ that is more refined than e. Since
these default rules are only added to the theory when also the prerequisite φe is added, one
can use the normal free default rules  :φe′/φe′ instead. In the case of the observations φe
and ψe′ , where φ and ψ are incompatible and e′ is more refined than e, it then is clear that
the expectation of φe is blocked by the truth of ψ at the approximation of reality induced
by e′.
If we abstract in our formal language from the evidence on which the observation is
based, then an observation can simply be modelled as a normal free default rule  :φ/φ.
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To properly capture the interaction of different observations, we will mirror the relation
between the underlying bodies of evidence in an ordering on the corresponding default
rules, thus arriving at prioritized default theory.
Definition 6. A prioritized default theory is a triple 〈D,Γ,<〉, where 〈D,Γ 〉 is a default
theory and < is a well-founded strict partial order on D. (That is, < is an irreflexive,
transitive relation with no infinite descending chain d1 > d2 > · · · .)
Definition 7. An observation theory is a prioritized normal free default theory.
If d and d ′ are default rules, then the intended meaning of d < d ′ is that d is
stronger than d ′ because d represents an observation based on evidence which is more
refined than the evidence on which the observation represented by d ′ is based. (This
reading of < is in accordance with the usually chosen direction of preference relations in
preferential semantics, where the preferred models are traditionally called minimal models.
Unfortunately, if one has the context of information orderings in mind, then it is natural to
expect the reverse reading.)
We call a piece of evidence e more refined than a piece of evidence e′ if and only if
the evidence e′ is taken into account in e. For example, if one takes a closer look, then one
obtains more refined evidence, assuming one remembers what was seen before. Notice that
obtaining more refined evidence does not necessarily warrant more specific conclusions,
where a conclusion φ is called more specific than ψ if φ logically entails ψ . This is due
to the default nature of observations, since, although usually one learns more by taking a
closer look, one sometimes learns that previous conclusions are unwarranted.
The assumption of < being well-founded is necessary for the definitions of extension
given below. The assumption (essentially the same as stopperedness of [11] and
smoothness of [9]) seems not too restrictive for our purpose, since it is automatically
satisfied if D is finite, and at any time a robot can have made only a finite number of
observations.
Below, we give the standard definition of extensions of a prioritized default theory. We
roughly follow [12], but the idea stems from [4].
Definition 8. A well-ordering ≺ on D is a well-founded (total) order on D. A well-ordering
≺ on D is called compatible with < on D iff for every d, d ′ ∈ D, d < d ′ implies d ≺ d ′.
Definition 9. Let 〈D,Γ,<〉 be a prioritized default theory. The set E is called an
<-compatible extension of 〈D,Γ,<〉 iff E is an extension of 〈D,Γ 〉 generated by a well-
ordering ≺ compatible with <.
Intuitively, an extension of 〈D,Γ 〉 generated by a well-ordering ≺ is obtained by
sequentially applying, starting from Th(Γ ), the ≺-minimal default rule among the non-
applied applicable default rules of D. (See [4,12] for details.) By choosing a well-ordering
compatible with <, the stronger defaults (with higher priorities) are applied first, thereby
making weaker incompatible defaults non-applicable.
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Example 2. Consider the observations pe and qe′ , and assume that it is a priori known
that p and q are incompatible, i.e., ¬(p ∧ q). Further assume that e′ is more refined
evidence than e. This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the
default theory 〈{ :p/p, :q/q}, {¬(p∧q)}〉 with priority  :q/q <  :p/p. The unique
extension of D is Th({¬p,q}). Without the priority, both Th({¬p,q}) and Th({¬q,p})
would have been extensions.
To make the example more concrete, suppose that pe denotes a robot’s observation,
based on some sonar readings, that a particular door is closed, and that qe′ denotes the
observation, based on a video camera image in addition to the previously mentioned sonar
readings, that the door is open. Then the robot should of course conclude that the door is
open.
In the above example, the same conclusion is warranted if the evidence e′ is just stronger
or more reliable than e, rather than more refined. However, as we will illustrate later on,
these different interpretations of the orderings can result in different conclusions in more
complex examples.
One can imagine that having different interpretations of the ordering between default
rules results in having different definitions of extensions of a prioritized default theory. In
fact, the above standard definition of <-compatible extension will not be used as our notion
of extension for observation theories.
Before we discuss which notion of extension we regard as appropriate for our purpose,
we will consider an alternative way of obtaining extensions of prioritized default theories,
namely by first computing an (ordinary default) extension using only the (unordered)
default rules with maximal priority, and subsequently computing an extension using the
default rules of the next priority level, et cetera. Again, this notion is not new, and can, for
example, also be found in [4], but a special case of it will turn out to be relevant in our
situation. For the special case of observation theories the above notion can be made more
precise as follows.
Definition 10. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. Define D0 = ∅, and let,
for i  1, Di be the set of <-minimal elements of D −⋃0ji−1 Dj . The set Th(Γ )
is called an 0-extension of D. For i  1, E is called an i-extension of D iff E =
Th(E′ ∪ CONSEQ(D′)), for some (i − 1)-extension E′ of D, and some maximal D′ ⊆ Di
such that E′ ∪ CONSEQ(D′) is consistent. Then E is called a layered extension of D iff
E =⋃i0 Ei , where, for each i  0, Ei is an i-extension of D and Ei ⊆ Ei+1.
The set of layered extensions of an observation theory 〈D,Γ,<〉 is a subset of its set of
<-compatible extensions.
Proposition 7. Let D= 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. Every layered extension of D
is a <-compatible extension of D.
Proof. Let E be a layered extension of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉. Then E can be obtained from Γ
by sequentially applying the default rules from a set D′ ⊆ D such that for every d, d ′ ∈ D′,
d < d ′ implies that d is applied before d ′. Moreover, for any d ∈ D − D′, its justification
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is inconsistent with Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′′), where D′′ = {d ′ ∈ D′: d ′  d}. Let ≺ be a well-
ordering obtained by refining < in such a way that, whenever d and d ′ are incomparable
according to < and d ∈ D′ and d ′ /∈ D′, it should hold that d ≺ d ′. The order between other
pairs of <-incomparable default rules can be chosen arbitrarily. Then E is an extension of
〈D,Γ 〉 generated by ≺, and since ≺ is compatible with <, E is a <-compatible extension
of D. 
The following example shows that the reverse of this proposition is not true.
Example 3. Consider the observations pe, qe′ and re′′ , and assume that it is a priori known
that p,q and r are jointly incompatible, i.e., ¬(p ∧ q ∧ r). Further assume that e′ is
more refined evidence than e (and e′′ is incomparable to the other bodies of evidence).
This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory
〈{ :p/p, :q/q, : r/r}, {¬(p ∧ q ∧ r)}〉 with priority  :q/q <  :p/p. The unique
layered extension ofD is Th({¬p,q, r}). However, both Th({¬p,q, r}) and Th({p,q,¬r})
are <-compatible extensions.
The following example indicates a problem with both layered extension and <-compati-
ble extensions in case d < d ′ is interpreted to mean that default rule d is based on more
refined evidence than d ′.
Example 4. Consider the observations pe, qe′ and re′′ , and assume that it is a priori known
that q is incompatible both with p and with r , i.e., ¬(p ∧ q) and ¬(r ∧ q). Further
assume that e′′ is more refined evidence than e′ and e′ is more refined evidence than e.
This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory
〈{ :p/p, :q/q, : r/r}, {(¬(p∧ q)) ∧ (¬(r ∧ q))}〉 with priority  : r/r <  :q/q <
 :p/p. This theory has one <-compatible extension Th({p,¬q, r}) and this extension is
also layered.
To make the example more concrete, consider a robot in the process of finding out
whether a particular door is open. Let us say that the door has to be open at least 70
degrees to be called open, since otherwise the robot cannot safely pass the door. Suppose
that pe denotes the robot’s observation, based on some video camera image taken from
considerable distance from the door, that the door is 84 degrees open, that qe′ denotes the
observation based on some sonar readings in addition to the video camera image, that the
door is closed, and that re′′ denotes the observation, based in addition to the previously
mentioned sensor information on a video camera image taken at close proximity to the
door, that the door is open (without being able to specify the exact angle of the door). Then
both <-compatible and layered extensions allow the conclusion that the door is 84 degrees
open.
The problem with this conclusion is that the observation pe is defeated by qe′ , and
it is not clear whether the fact that qe′ is in turn defeated by re′′ justifies re-establishing
the conclusions based on pe . In fact, if e′′ is more refined than e, then the information
supporting p in the first observation is also present in e′′. Therefore, if one assumes that r
is the most specific proposition (relative to the background knowledge) supported by the
observation re′′ , then p should not be derivable.
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It is important to note that in the above example we introduced the assumption that the
proposition mentioned in the observation is the most specific proposition (relative to the
background knowledge) that is justified given the evidence on which the observation is
based. This assumption and its relation to the treatment of the problem of sensor fusion
will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.
Given the above assumption, it is natural to consider only the default rules in the
top layer of the ordering, and propose 1-extensions (as defined in Definition 10) as
the appropriate extensions of an observation theory. Of course, any 1-extension of an
observation theory 〈D,Γ,<〉 is equivalent to an (ordinary Reiter) extension of the normal
free default theory 〈D1,Γ 〉, where D1 is the set of <-minimal default rules of D, as defined
in Definition 10.
At first sight, one might think that, by the semi-monotonicity of normal default logic
(see Proposition 4), the resulting logic will have a monotonic behaviour. However, this is
prevented by the ordering on defaults, since adding an observation does not necessarily
result in a monotonic increase in the <-minimal default rules.
Example 5. Consider the situation of Example 4. The observation theory D consisting
of the default theory 〈{ :p/p, :q/q, : r/r}, {(¬(p∧ q))∧ (¬(r ∧ q))}〉 with priority
 : r/r <  :q/q <  :p/p has a unique 1-extension, namely Th({r,¬q}). If we consider
the situation without the observation modelled by  : r/r , then the resulting observation
theory has the unique 1-extension Th({¬p,q,¬r}). That is, without the evidence of the
video camera at close proximity to the door, the conclusion that the door is closed would
be justified.
In fact, the logic obtained by considering 1-extensions of observation theories is an
interesting nonmonotonic formalism, in which it is, for example, possible to ‘withdraw’ an
observation pe (where p cannot be deduced from the background knowledge) by adding
the observation e′ with e′ more refined than e. (More generally, any φe′ , where φ together
with the background knowledge does not imply p and e′ more refined than e has a similar
effect.)
The above property seems to imply that one can model contraction from the AGM
theory of belief revision [8] as a kind of expansion: adding an observation can lead to
withdrawing beliefs without adding new beliefs. However, in the AGM theory expansion
assumes that the item added to the set of beliefs is a (propositional) sentence, not a default.
Although we believe to have good reasons for choosing 1-extensions as the appropriate
kind of extensions of observation logic, we propose in the next section a rather general
semantics for observation theories that allows us to consider different variants of
observation logic next to the logic induced by 1-extensions. This also us to compare
different observation logics from a semantical point of view.
5. Semantics
An observation theory 〈D,Γ,<〉 is called consistent iff Γ is consistent. Unless stated
otherwise, we will from now on assume that observation theories are consistent, and
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moreover, we will assume that for any observation theory 〈D,Γ,<〉 the facts Γ are
consistent with every consequent of a default rule d ∈ D. These assumptions are in
accordance with our treatment of Γ as ‘hard’ background knowledge.
As models of observation theories we essentially use directed sets of first-order models,
where the ordering between the first-order models representing the observations reflects
the (refinement) ordering of (the evidence underlying) the observations. As a reminder we
include the definition of a directed set.
Definition 11. Let  be a partial order on the set X. Then 〈X,〉 is called a directed set iff
every finite subset of X has an upper bound in X, i.e., for every finite Y ⊆ X, there exists
an element x ∈ X such that for every y ∈ Y , x  y .
Definition 12. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. An observation model M of
D is a tuple 〈M,,obs〉, where 〈M,〉 is a directed set of first-order models satisfying Γ ,
and obs is an injection D → M such that the following conditions are satisfied.
• obs(d) satisfies the consequent of d ;
• if d < d ′, then obs(d) obs(d ′).
For any first-order sentence φ, we say that M |= φ iff there exists a modelM ∈ M such
that every modelM′ M satisfies φ. For any set S of observation models, we write Th(S)
for the set of first-order formulas that are valid in every model of S.
There are many different ways to extend the scope of the satisfaction relation to include
the default rules. Perhaps the most straightforward way is to define, for any default rule
d ∈ D, M |= d iff every model M  obs(d) satisfies the consequent of d . Observation
models where the satisfaction relation is thus extended are called straight. More generally,
observation models where the satisfaction relation is (in some way) extended to include
default rules are called extended.
Let us make a few cautionary remarks related to this definition. The first remark is that
an observation model is not a classical first-order model. In fact, an observation model
plays a role which is roughly similar to a possible worlds, or Kripke, model in modal
epistemic logic, namely as a model of an agent’s belief set such that the agent’s belief set
corresponds to the set of formulas valid in all its models. More precisely, an observation
model of an observation theory models the beliefs of an agent who believes all the facts
and a subset of the conclusions of the default rules present in the observation theory. Since
we consider agents who, by default, believe the observations, we will be interested in
observation models which maximize the set of valid default conclusions, or rather, the
set of applied or valid default rules.
A second remark is about the use of Th: in this paper Th can be applied to sets
of observation models. However, even if the observation models are extended and the
satisfaction of both first-order formulas and default rules are defined, the result Th(S) of
applying Th to a set S of observation models is still a set of first-order formulas (as usual),
and does not include default rules.
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Finally, notice that the second condition of Definition 12 involves a change in direction
of the orderings. We feel this is appropriate, since the ordering on the models should
be viewed as an information ordering. In the context of definition obs(d)  obs(d ′) is
equivalent to obs(d) > obs(d ′). The intuitive reading of M′ >M is that M′ is more
refined than M. Notice however, that we have not implemented a formal notion of
refinement as in the inverse refining systems of models of [10]. An (information) ordering
between models mirroring a preference relation < between default rules as specified in
the second item of Definition 12 will be called an information image of <. This notion of
information image will be used in Definition 19 of the observation models corresponding
to using the standard <-compatible extensions of prioritized default theory for observation
theories.
It is clear that there are two kinds of observation models. An observation model
〈M,,obs〉 either has a top, i.e., a modelM ∈ M which is more refined than any other
element of M , or M contains for any of its elements an infinite sequent of refinements. In
the latter case, we call the observation model topless. These topless observation models are
more like the refining inverse systems of models of [10] than the observation models with a
top are. In [10], each first-order model in the refining system is viewed as an approximation
to reality which itself is assumed to be infinitely precise and to refine each of the models in
the refining system. However, in an observation model the top (or any other element) does
not represent the reality (or an approximation of it) but (a partial description of) a world
considered possible by the observing agent.
It is easy to see that in Definition 12 we could have restricted ourselves to topless
observation models, since any observation model is equivalent to a topless one. (Just add
an infinite sequence of copies of the top-element on top of the top-element.) However,
below we will consider observation models where the satisfaction of default rules is defined
differently than for the straight observation models of Definition 12, and for some of these
variants it does make a difference whether observation models have a top or not.
The directedness condition ensures that default rules interact in the sense that a set
of incompatible default rules cannot be satisfied in an observation model. As mentioned
before, the most interesting observation models are those in which the set of valid default
rules are maximized. In accordance with tradition, we will call these observation models
minimal.
Definition 13. Let M be a straight observation model of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 and let M(D) =
{d ∈ D: M |= d}. M is called minimal iff there exists no straight observation model M′
of D such that M(D) ⊂ M′(D). We write [M]D for the equivalence class of straight
observation models M′ of D such that M′(D) = M(D).
The above defined notions can be defined analogously for types of extended observation
models other than the straight observation models. The following property is suggested as
a minimal requirement on ways to extend the satisfaction relation of observation models to
default rules.
Definition 14. A class of extended observation models M of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 is called
regular iff for every element M of the class, Th([M]D) = Th(Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D))).
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Lemma 8. The class of straight observation models of an observation theory is regular.Proof. Assume M is a straight observation model of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉. We will first show
that Th(Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D))) ⊆ Th([M]D). Suppose φ ∈ Th(Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D))).
Then φ ∈ Th(Σ), for some finite subset Σ of Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D)). By the directedness
condition, any M′ ∈ [M]D contains a modelM such that for allM′ M,M′ |= Σ , and
thereforeM′ |= φ. Thus φ ∈ Th([M]D).
To prove the inclusion in the other direction, it is sufficient to show that for any first-
order modelM of Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D)), there exists a first-order equivalent observation
model in M(D). This is easy, since addingM as top to any element of M(D) will give the
desired observation model equivalent toM. 
5.1. Observation models corresponding to 1-extensions
We now introduce an alternative kind of observation models, called the one level
observation models, in order to model the 1-extensions of observations theories.
Definition 15. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. A one level observation
model M of D is an observation model 〈M,,obs〉 where we say that M |= d iff every
model M  obs(d) satisfies the consequent of d , and there exists no d ′ ∈ D such that
obs(d ′) > obs(d).
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 8 it can be shown that the class of one level
observation models of an observation theory is regular. More importantly, there is an exact
correspondence between minimal one level observation models of an observation theory
and its 1-extensions.
Proposition 9. The 1-extensions of an observation theory correspond with its minimal one
level observation models. That is, E is a 1-extension of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 iff E = Th([M]D)
for some minimal one level observation model M of D.
Proof. Let E be a 1-extension of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉. Then it holds that E = Th(Γ ∪
CONSEQ(D′)), for some maximal D′ ⊆ D1 = {d ∈ D: d is <-minimal} such that Γ ∪
CONSEQ(D′) is consistent. By the consistency of Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′), there exists a
one level observation model M of D such that M(D) = D′. By the maximality of
D′, M is minimal, and by the regularity of one level observation models, Th([M]D) =
Th(Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′)) = E.
To prove the other direction, suppose E = Th([M]D) for some minimal one level
observation model M of D. Then, by the regularity of one level observation models,
E = Th(Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D))). By the directedness condition, Γ ∪ CONSEQ(M(D))
is consistent, and by the minimality of M, there does not exist a set D′′ such that
M(D) ⊂ D′′ ⊆ D1 and Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′′) is consistent. It follows that E is a 1-extension
of D. 
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5.2. Extensions corresponding to straight observation modelsSince the notion of satisfying a default rule is more straightforward in the case of straight
observation models than in the case of one level observation models, it is interesting to
determine the kind of extensions corresponding with minimal straight observation models.
Definition 16. LetD = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. A set D′ ⊂ D is called blocked
iff there exists a d ∈ D such that Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′ ∪ {d}) is inconsistent and for every
d ′ ∈ D′, d < d ′. A set D′ ⊆ D is called unblocked iff D′ contains no blocked subset.
Definition 17. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. The E is called an unblocked
extension of D iff E = Th(Γ ∪CONSEQ(D′)), for some maximal unblocked D′ ⊆ D such
that Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′) is consistent.
Proposition 10. The unblocked extensions of an observation theory correspond with
its minimal straight observation models. That is, E is an unblocked extension of
D= 〈D,Γ,<〉 iff E = Th([M]D) for some minimal straight observation model M of D.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 9. The only
difference is that one now should use the fact that D′ is a set of default rules satisfied
by some straight observation model iff D′ is unblocked and CONSEQ(D′) is consistent,
and let the unblocked sets play the role that subsets of the <-minimal default rules play in
the case of Proposition 9. 
The difference between 1-extensions and unblocked extensions is that in the first case,
an observation is assumed to defeat all observations based on less refined evidence,
whereas in the latter case, observations that are not based on maximally refined evidence
can still play a role (as long as they are not blocked by some incompatible observation
based on more refined evidence).
Example 6. Consider the situation of Example 4, but without the second observation qe′ .
That is, we have the observations pe and re′′ , where e′′ is more refined evidence than e.
This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory
〈{ :p/p, : r/r},∅〉 with priority  : r/r <  :p/p. This theory has one 1-extension
Th({r}) and one unblocked extension Th({p, r}).
In the concrete interpretation of a robot in the process of finding out whether a particular
door is open, pe denotes the robot’s observation, based on some video camera image taken
from considerable distance from the door, that the door is 84 degrees open, and re′′ denotes
the observation, additionally based on a video camera image taken at close proximity to
the door, that the door is open (without being able to specify the exact angle of the door). In
that case, the 1-extension only allows the conclusion that the door is open (without being
able to specify the exact angle), whereas the unblocked extension allows the more specific
conclusion that the door is 84 degrees open.
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The above example provides another illustration of our previously mentioned opinion
that 1-extensions are only appropriate under the assumption that observations mention
the most specific proposition. If one uses unblocked extensions, one does not need this
assumption, but it is not exactly clear how to justify the fact that an observation that itself
is defeated can still defeat some observations. (In the original situation of Example 4, the
observation qe′ blocks pe , although qe′ is defeated by the observation re′′ . Thus the unique
unblocked extension coincides with the 1-extension Th({r}).)
5.3. Models corresponding to <-compatible extensions
If one believes that observations should not be blocked by defeated observations, then
one should not use unblocked extensions. In that case, <-compatible extensions seem to
be an obvious choice. In order to obtain a semantics for <-compatible extensions in terms
of observation models, we should no longer require M |= d to imply that every model
M  obs(d) satisfies the consequent of d . (Otherwise, a default rule d is automatically
blocked by an incompatible default rule d ′ such that obs(d ′) > obs(d).)
A first idea might be to allow a finite number of exceptions (i.e., models > obs(d) not
satisfying the consequent of d) in the satisfaction clause for default rules. This does not
work, since a finite extended observation model of 〈D,Γ,<〉 would then satisfy all default
rules of D. Thus the minimal extended observation models would satisfy all the default
rules, whether the rules are compatible or not. It is immediate that, in general, the class
of the thus obtained extended observation models of an observation theory would not be
regular.
Even if we restrict ourselves to topless observation models, we do not obtain a semantics
for <-compatible extensions, since the effect of the ordering is completely lost as soon as
a finite number of exceptions is allowed in the satisfaction clause for default rules. In fact,
in that case, we get a semantics for the underlying default theory, without the priorities.
Definition 18. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. A cofinal observation model
M of D is an extended topless observation model 〈M,,obs〉 of D, where we say that
M |= d iff all but a finite number of the modelsM obs(d) satisfy the consequent of d .
It can be shown that the class of cofinal observation models of an observation theory
is regular. (The proof of Lemma 8 has to be slightly amended, since after adding a top to
a cofinal model it is no longer topless, and therefore no longer cofinal. However, instead
of adding a single first-order model as a top, one can simply add an infinite sequence of
copies of the first-order model.)
Proposition 11. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. The minimal cofinal
observation models of D correspond with the (ordinary Reiter) extensions of 〈D,Γ 〉. That
is, E is an extension of 〈D,Γ 〉 iff E = Th([M]D) for some minimal cofinal observation
model M of D.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 9. The only
difference is that one now should use the fact that D′ is a set of default rules satisfied
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by some cofinal observation model of D iff Γ ∪ CONSEQ(D′) is consistent, and let these
compatible sets of default rules play the role that subsets of the <-minimal default rules
play in the case of Proposition 9. 
If one tries to model the situation where observations are not blocked by defeated
observations, then one should not allow arbitrary exceptions in the satisfaction clause for
default rules, but only allow exceptions among the first-order models representing defeated
observations. This suggests a definition of the satisfaction of a default rule along the lines
of M |= d iff for all M > obs(d) either M satisfies the consequent of d or there exist
a d ′ ∈ D such that M = obs(d ′) and M |= ¬d ′, where M |= ¬d ′ is a notation for ‘d ′ is
defeated’.
The problem with this approach is that the satisfaction and defeat of default rules interact
in intricate ways, since the more default rules are satisfied, the more default rules are
defeated, and vice versa. Therefore, it is not immediately clear what the correct definition
of defeat would have to be. A simple solution is to introduce in the extended observation
models an additional parameter for a particular well-ordering ≺ compatible with the partial
order < on default rules.
Definition 19. Let D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 be an observation theory. A <-compatible observation
model M of D is an extended observation model 〈M,,obs〉 of D, where  is an
information image of a <-compatible well-ordering ≺, and the satisfaction and defeat of
default rules are defined as follows:
• M |= d iff for allM obs(d) eitherM satisfies the consequent of d or there exists
a d ′ ∈ D such thatM= obs(d ′) and M |= ¬d ′.
• M |= ¬d ′ iff Γ ∪ CONSEQ({d ′} ∪ {d ′′ ∈ M(D): d ′′ ≺ d ′}) is inconsistent.
Here (as before) M(D) = {d ∈ D: M |= d}, and we define [M]D to be the equivalence
class of <-compatible observation models M′′ of D such that M′′(D) = M(D).
Notice that in the above definition the notions of satisfaction and defeat of default rules
are well defined since their respective clauses only refer to other default rules that are more
preferred according to ≺. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 8 it can be shown that the
class of <-compatible observation models of an observation theory is regular.
We admit that Definition 19 is not completely satisfactory, since it does not provide
an easily described subclass of observation models corresponding to <-compatible
extensions. However, given the intricate interaction of the ordered default rules in
prioritized default logic, expecting a simple characterization in terms of observation
models is perhaps unrealistic.
Proposition 12. The minimal <-compatible observation models of an observation theory
D = 〈D,Γ,<〉 correspond with the <-compatible extensions of D. That is, E is a
<-compatible extension of D iff E = Th([M]D) for some minimal <-compatible
observation model M of D.
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Proof. Suppose E is a <-compatible extension of D = 〈D,Γ,<〉. Then E is an extension
of 〈D,Γ 〉 generated by some <-compatible well-ordering ≺. It follows that E = Th(Γ ∪
CONSEQ(D′)), for some D′ ⊆ D such that d /∈ D′ implies that Γ ∪ CONSEQ({d} ∪
{d ′ ∈ D′: d ′ ≺ d}) is inconsistent. Consider the class of <-compatible observation models
M of D where  is an information image of ≺. For every M in this class, the defeated
default rules are exactly the elements of D − D′. Let M be a model of this class with a
maximal set of satisfied defaults. Then M is minimal, M(D) = D′, and by regularity,
Th([M]D) = E.
To prove the other direction, let E = Th([M]D), for some minimal <-compatible
observation model M of D. Suppose  is the information image of the <-compatible
well-ordering ≺ of D. By the minimality of M, M(D) is the complement of
the set of defeated default rules. Therefore, d /∈ M(D) implies that the set Γ ∪
CONSEQ({d}∪ {d ′ ∈ M(D): d ′ ≺ d}) is inconsistent. Thus Th(Γ ∪CONSEQ(M(D)))
is a <-compatible extension of D. By the regularity of <-compatible observation models,
it then follows that E is a <-compatible extension of D. 
We conclude that the proposed observation models can provide a flexible semantics for
different observation logics. In the following section we discuss in more detail the matter
under what circumstances the different observation logics are most appropriate, and we
relate this matter to the much discussed problem of sensor fusion in robotics.
6. The sensor fusion problem
Evidence from one particular, isolated sensor reading is relatively well understood. One
usually has at least sufficient partial or approximate knowledge of the behaviour, and in
particular of the reliability, of a sensor to confidently relate possible sensor readings to
conclusions about the state of the world. Unfortunately, since sensors are never completely
reliable and often quite unreliable, these conclusions are typically fairly weak. Therefore,
multiple sensor readings need to be combined in order to justify strong conclusions.
The problem with combining, or fusing, the evidence obtained from multiple sensor
readings is that it is difficult to assess the interaction between multiple pieces of evidence
acquired from different sensors, from different readings of the same sensor obtained at
different locations, or even from readings of the same sensor obtained at the same location.
Typically, one uses some numeric uncertainty formalism, such as probability theory,
which allows the reinforcement of conclusions whenever sensor readings agree and
(partial) cancelling out of the individual effects of disagreeing sensor readings. This
probabilistic, or in general numeric, reasoning is very powerful, but it requires a lot of
data or strong assumptions. Since often the required data is insufficiently available and the
chosen assumptions cannot adequately be justified, the conclusions obtained by numeric
reasoning cannot always be trusted.
Since we use non-numeric default rules to represent observations, we cannot expect the
same subtle reasoning. But default reasoning still may give reasonable and useful results,
and, in particular in situations where the numeric data required for numeric reasoning
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cannot easily be obtained, the results of default reasoning are not necessarily inferior to
those of the numeric approaches.
Let us briefly comment on the relation between expressing an observation in terms
of (normal free) default rules and the representation of an observation in numeric, say
probabilistic, terms. At first sight, it might seem reasonable to assume that a defeasible
observation that φ, represented by  :φ/φ, has a roughly equivalent probabilistic
interpretation of the form that, given the evidence, φ is the most likely, or most probable,
possibility. The problem with this assumption is that either the most likely possibility is
trivially , or one has to compare only possibilities corresponding to elementary events or,
more generally, possibilities corresponding to some partition of the sample space, and it is
difficult to fix in advance an appropriate partition.
Example 7. In the situation of Example 4, the observation re′′ , based on a video camera
image taken at close proximity to the door, supports the possibility that the door is open
(without supporting any exact angle of the door). This could be interpreted to mean that
‘open’ is the most likely element of {‘open’, ‘closed’}. However, the observation pe, based
on some video camera image taken from considerable distance from the door, supports the
possibility that the door is 84 degrees open. If this possibility is supposed to be the most
likely one given the evidence e, then possibilities are compared that are not elements of the
set {‘open’, ‘closed’} used in the case of re′′ .
An alternative probabilistic interpretation of the default rule  :φ/φ representing a
defeasible observation is to say that it is roughly equivalent to saying that, given the
evidence, the probability of φ is sufficiently high. It is well known that, unless sufficiently
high is interpreted as arbitrarily close to 1, both interpretations support different sets of
inference rules. For example, whenever φ and ψ are compatible,  :φ/φ and  :ψ/ψ
together support φ ∧ ψ , whereas in the probabilistic interpretation this inference is not
valid, since the probability of the conjunction φ ∧ ψ may be significantly lower than the
probabilities of the individual conjuncts.
In spite of the fact that no exact agreement exists between the conclusion supported by
default rules and those supported by the above mentioned probabilistic interpretation of
default rules, we still think the interpretation is at least useful as a heuristic. For example,
the fact that evidence that does not support a rather specific proposition (such as ‘the door
is 84 degrees open’) can still support a less specific proposition (such as ‘the door is open’)
is quite clear under the probabilistic interpretation.
For an adequate evaluation of the usefulness of the interpretation of observations by
means of default rules, it is important to know how multiple observations are combined.
To get an overview of how the choice for a particular notion of extension affects the
combination behaviour, we summarize in Table 1 the conclusions supported by the
different defeasible observation logics in several examples, namely Example 4, which
originally suggested using 1-extensions, the slightly simpler Example 6, and the following
new Example 8.
Example 8. Consider the situation of Example 6, but now add an observation se′′′ assume
that this observation is incomparable to both other observations. Let us say that in the
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Table 1
A comparison of the conclusions supported by different notions of extensions. In Example 4 we have a refining
sequence of observations that the door is 84 degrees open (video camera, great distance), that the door is closed
(sonar), and that the door is open (video camera, small distance). Example 6 is the same, but without the sonar-
based observation that the door is closed. In the new Example 8, we add to Example 6 a new observation that the
door is 79 degrees open, and we assume that this observation is incomparable to both other observations
Extensions Example 4 Example 6 Example 8
1-extensions open open 79◦ open
<-compatible 84◦ open 84◦ open 79◦ or 84◦ open
unblocked open 84◦ open 79◦ or 84◦ open
layered 84◦ open 84◦ open 79◦ open
without priorities closed or 84◦ open 84◦ open 79◦ or 84◦ open
concrete interpretation of the robot trying to figure out the state of a particular door that
this observation corresponds to the observation that the door is 79 degrees open. That
is, we have the observations pe , re′′ and se′′′ , where e′′ is more refined evidence than e.
This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory
〈{ :p/p, : r/r, : s/s},∅〉 with priority  : r/r <  :p/p.
It is easy to see that the conclusions supported by 1-extensions are included in the set
of conclusions supported by layered extensions, since for every layered extension E of an
observation theory D there exists a 1-extension E′ of D such that E′ ⊆ E. It follows from
the examples summarized in Table 1 that, in general, the set of conclusions supported by
1-extensions is not necessarily weaker (or stronger) than the set of conclusions supported
by <-compatible, unblocked, or unprioritized extensions.
In Example 6, all the discussed types of extensions, except the 1-extensions, support the
conclusion that the door is 84 degrees open. As mentioned before, this strong conclusion
is no longer justified if the observation that the door is open is assumed to be based on
evidence which is really more refined than (and therefore includes) the evidence underlying
the observation that the door is 84 degrees open, and if one additionally assumes that ‘the
door is open’ is the most specific conclusion supported by the more refined evidence.
Assuming that the evidence e underlying the observation that the door is open is more
refined than the evidence e′ underlying the observation that the door is 84 degrees open
implies that e does not consist only of the video camera image taken near the door, but also
incorporates the video camera image taken from considerable distance (e′). In other words,
more refined evidence combines the less refined evidence (possibly) with new sensory
information.
Although usually the evidence from one particular observation or sensor reading is
better understood than the combined effect of several observations, it is also sometimes
the case that in order to express a particular observation in an abstract, symbolic language,
one has to take into account several other observations. For example, when interpreting
a video camera image and concluding from it that the door is open, one typically uses
information obtained by other sensor readings about matters like the approximate distance
between the camera and the door. Therefore, even if at one level of description sensor
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readings are initially interpreted in isolation, it may be the case that at some more abstract
level, observations often refine other (previous) observations.
The pieces of evidence underlying incomparable (maximally preferred) observations
can be viewed as pieces of evidence that (as yet) have not been combined, and the
defeasible observation logic using 1-extensions can be viewed as a logic providing
(defeasible) statements of what the results of the combination of these pieces of evidence
are expected to be. In fact the process of combining two observations φe and ψe′ can be
represented by adding an observation based on evidence refining both e and e′. Since it is
not necessary for this latter observation to incorporate some new sensory information, one
might consider the sensor fusion process itself as a kind of ‘observation’.
It should be noted that, although we have used the sceptical, or cautious, interpretation
of default consequence, it is not the case that the expectations concerning the results
of combining evidence as expressed by the observation logic using 1-extensions are the
weakest possible, or most cautious.
Example 9. Consider two observations φe and ψe′ , where φ denotes that the door is 84
degrees open and ψ denotes that the door is 79 degrees open, and where e and e′ are
incomparable. The observation logic using 1-extensions supports the conclusion that the
door is 79 or 84 degrees open. However, after proper combination of e and e′ it might be
the case that both pieces of evidence are considered unreliable, and it might even become
unclear whether the pieces of evidence provide any information concerning the state of the
door at all.
We conclude that reasoning with the observation logic using 1-extensions should not
replace a careful sensor fusion process. However, as long as the defeasible conclusions of
the observation logic are recognized as defeasible expectations, they form a potentially
useful supplement to the conclusions based on the (at any particular time, probably
incomplete) process of careful combination of obtained evidence.
Using <-compatible, unblocked, and layered extensions does not seem compatible with
a reading of < as a refining relation. In that case, < is more naturally interpreted as a
relation expressing relative strength or reliability of pieces of evidence. The observation
logics using these different notions of extensions implement different intuitions concerning
the issue of how to combine observations, but they all, in a sense, replace a careful sensor
fusion process, rather than supplement it.
However, since we believe that, in general, a careful combination of the observations
cannot adequately be represented, or even approximated, by a systematic interaction
between the default rules representing the observations, we prefer 1-extensions above the
other mentioned notions of extension.
7. The multiple extension problem
The standard explanation of the meaning of a normal, free default rule  :ω/ω allows
the derivation of ω, provided ω is consistent with what is derivable. Assuming that an
extension is intended to represent a reasonable set of conclusions of the default theory, the
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existence of multiple extensions constitutes a problem, since any choice for a particular
extension is arbitrary in the sense that it does not follow from the (default) theory.
The problem does not disappear in case the intersection of all extensions is proposed to
be the set of conclusions of a default theory. The difficulty with this cautious or sceptical
approach is that in general the intersection is itself not an extension and not closed under
the default rules.
Example 10. Consider the default theory consisting of the two default rules  :p/p and
 :q/q and background knowledge ¬(p ∧ q). This default theory has two extensions:
Th({p,¬q}) and Th({¬p,q}). The intersection of the extensions is Th({p ↔ ¬q}). If this
intersection is supposed to be the set of all derivable conclusions, then, under the standard
interpretation of default rules,  :p/p is applicable, and p is derivable. In the same way,
 :q/q allows the derivation of q . But Th({p ↔ ¬q}) contains neither p nor q .
A possible solution of the problem is to come up with an alternative interpretation of
default rules, where the justification does not refer to the set of derivable conclusions. When
default rules are used to represent defeasible observations, such an alternative interpretation
is actually rather natural.
An observation φe is a reason to conclude that φ, and this reason is sufficient, unless
other (incomparable or more refined) observations provide reasons against φ. If these other
observations are based on more refined evidence than e, then the observation φe is defeated.
If the other observations are incomparable to φe, then the supported conclusion is weaker
than φ, but φ should still be considered possible. Thus, the default rule  :φ/φ representing
φe supports the conclusion φ only in case all evidence against φ is less refined than e.
Given the interpretation of a (normal, free) default rule as a (not necessarily sufficient)
reason to conclude the consequent of the rule, the sceptical approach to default logic seems
quite sensible. In the sceptical approach, extensions should not be interpreted as reasonable
sets of conclusions of a default theory, but as maximally consistent sets of conclusions,
mirroring the interaction between the default rules.
For example, the intersection Th({p ↔ ¬q}) of the extensions Th({p,¬q}) and
Th({¬p,q}) seems to be a reasonable set of conclusion in case of Example 10. The fact
that there is a reason for believing p and a reason for believing q is compatible with this
set of conclusions, since the reasons are only considered sufficient for actually drawing the
conclusions in case all conflicting evidence is less refined.
If default rules are used to represent defeasible observation, then there is a second
solution to the multiple extension problem. Since multiple extensions only occur in the
presence of conflicting default rules, one can simply avoid the formalization of conflicting
observations. For example, one can apply a process of sensor fusion to harmonize
conflicting observations, before translating the observation into default rules. The resulting
observation logic will have a unique extension.
In the context of 1-extensions, it is always possible to ‘weaken’ several conflicting
observations to their disjunction. For example, pe and qe′ , with p and q incompatible and e
and e′ incomparable, can be replaced by (p∨q)e′′ , with e′′ more refined than e and e′. This
can be viewed as a particular method of combining (possibly conflicting) observations, but
the conclusions resulting from harmonizing conflicting observations with this particular
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method of sensor fusion are in general weaker than the conclusions supported by taking
the intersection of all 1-extensions of the original observation theory.
Example 11. Consider the default theory consisting of the three default rules  :p/p,
 :q/q ,  : r/r , and background knowledge ¬(p ∧ q ∧ r). This default theory has three
extensions: Th({p,q,¬r}), Th({p,¬q, r}), and Th({¬p,q, r}). Each of these extensions
contains the formula ¬p → (q ∧ r), but this formula is not contained in Th({¬(p ∧ q ∧
r),p ∨ q ∨ r}), which is the unique 1-extension of the observation theory obtained from
the original default theory by adding a default rule  :p ∨ q ∨ r/p ∨ q ∨ r refining the
original three default rules.
The possibility of weakening conflicting pieces of information using disjunction has
been proposed by many authors in different contexts, including possibility theory [6] and
belief revision [1]. Several of these authors remark that the thus obtained conclusions are
typically rather weak.
One can of course try to represent other, perhaps more complex, sensor fusion methods
in observation logic, but we will not pursue this matter here.
8. Conclusions
We have shown how defeasible observations can be formalized using prioritized normal
free default logic, i.e., observation logic. Several notions of extension for this special case
of default logic have been discussed, and it has been argued that the notion of 1-extension is
the most appropriate, provided the priority relation is assumed to be a refining relation, and
the formula mentioned in an observation statement is maximally specific, or informative.
The proposed semantics for observation logic is loosely based on the refining systems
for the logic of vision presented in [10], and is sufficiently general to cover several variants
of observation logic induced by various notions of extension. The difference between
1-extensions and the other notions is caused by a difference in the way the satisfaction
relation of an observation model is extended to include default rules.
We argued that the observation logic induced by 1-extensions cannot replace a careful
sensor fusion process, but that it can supplement sensor fusion by giving some statements
of the expected combined effect of observations before the underlying pieces of evidence
are actually combined in a careful (but difficult) sensor fusion process.
Finally, we claim that the existence of multiple extensions of an observation theory
does not constitute a problem for observation logic, since the default rules representing
defeasible observations have a natural interpretation where the justification of a default
rule does not refer to the set of conclusions of the observation theory.
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